Code-coverage-based test data adequacy criteria typically treat all coverable code elements (such as statements, basic blocks, or outcomes of decisions) as equal. In practice, however, the probability that a test case can expose a fault in a code element varies: some faults are more easily revealed than others. Thus, several researchers have suggested that if one could estimate the probability that a fault in a code element will cause a failure, one could use this estimate to determine the number of executions of a code element that are required to achieve a certain level of confidence in that element's correctness. This estimate, in turn, could be used to improve the fault-detection effectiveness of test suites, and help testers distribute testing resources more effectively. This conjecture is intriguing; however, like many such conjectures it has never been directly examined empirically. If empirical evidence were to support this conjecture, it would motivate further research into methodologies for obtaining fault-exposure-potential estimates and incorporating them into test data adequacy criteria. This paper reports the results of experiments conducted to investigate the effects of incorporating an estimate of fault exposure probability into the statement coverage test data adequacy criterion. The results of these experiments, however, ran contrary to the conjectures of previous researchers. Although incorporation of the estimates did produce statistically significant increases in the fault-detection effectiveness of test suites, these increases were quite small, suggesting that the approach might not be able to produce the gains hoped for, and might not be worth the cost of employing.
several factors, including whether the test case causes the fault to create a change in program state, and whether it causes that change in state to propagate to output [4, 5, 11, 15, 17, 18] .
Several researchers have therefore conjectured that if one could estimate the probability that a fault in a code component will cause a failure, one could use this estimate to improve the fault-detection effectiveness of code-coverage-based testing [4, 5, 7, 16, 18] . For example, an estimate of the probability that a fault in a component will cause a failure could be coupled with an overall "confidence" requirement to estimate the number of executions of the component that are necessary to achieve a certain probability of that component's correctness [5, 7, 18] . This conjecture is intriguing; however, like many such intriguing ideas in the software testing literature, it has never been directly empirically evaluated. Voas [18] reports results of a study assessing the correlation between PIE (propagation, infection, and execution) analysis sensitivity estimates and failures observed in random testing. Goradia [4] reports results of a study in which an estimate of fault propagation probability is assessed for correlation with actual fault exposure data. Neither of these studies, however, examined the effects of directly incorporating such estimates into test data adequacy criteria.
If empirical evidence were to support the conjecture that fault exposure probability estimates could be used to improve the fault-detection effectiveness of code-coverage-based testing, this would motivate further research on cost-effective techniques for obtaining such estimates, and on techniques for incorporating such estimates into testing. If successful, such research could help testers distribute testing resources more effectively and improve the quality of testing.
The authors of this paper thus conducted an experiment to investigate the effects of incorporating an estimate of fault exposure probability (referred to here as a fault exposure potential estimate) into the statement coverage test data adequacy criterion. The results of this experiment, however, did not meet expectations.
Although incorporation of a fault-exposure-potential estimate did produce statistically significant increases in the fault-detection effectiveness of test suites, these increases were small. Moreover, further experiments aimed at a particular class of faults which should be more likely to provide opportunities for improvements produced smaller improvements than anticipated. Together, these results suggest that the approach might not be able to produce the gains hoped for, and might not be worth the cost of employing.
The results presented in this paper are essentially "negative": they do not lead directly to a practical technique. This does not imply that the results are unimportant. In medical research, empirical results that show that proposed remedies do not work are worthwhile because they help direct researchers away from ineffective approaches to more profitable activities. Where the results presented here are concerned, several researchers have suggested employment of techniques based on estimates of fault exposure and devoted time to such techniques, and these results suggest that such research resources might be better deployed.
The next section of this paper discusses fault exposure estimates and their incorporation into test data adequacy criteria. Sections 3 and 4 describe our experiments, presenting research questions, measures, exper-iment design, results and analysis, threats to validity, and discussion. Section 5 provides overall discussion reflecting on the results of all experiments. Section 6 presents conclusions.
Preliminaries

Incorporating Fault Exposure Probability Estimates into Adequacy Criteria
The related notions that some faults are more easily exposed than others and that some source code elements are more easily tested than others have been frequently addressed in the research literature, and several researchers [4, 5, 7, 11, 15, 17, 18] have proposed or investigated models of various aspects of fault-detection phenomena. These models in general express the probability that a test case can expose a fault in a code element, if that code element contains a fault, as a combination of three factors: (1) whether the test case executes the code element, (2) whether it causes the fault to create a change in program state, and (3) whether it causes that change in state to propagate to output.
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Estimates of these factors can be combined to estimate the probability that a fault in a code element will cause a failure under a particular input distribution [18] . Following suggestions by Hamlet [7] and Voas [18] , such an estimate can be used to determine the number of test cases that are needed to obtain a certain level of confidence in the correctness of a code element.
2 Let x be a code element, let p l be the estimated probability that a fault in x will cause a failure, and let c be the confidence that the failure probability of x is less than p l . In this case, the number of test cases hn that must be executed through x to obtain confidence level c is given by the equation:
For practical purposes two special cases involving equation (1) hn may be a non-integer and, to retain the required level of confidence, must be rounded up.
The application of equation (1) (with the two adaptations just outlined) to a set of code elements at a given level of confidence defines a set of hit numbers, one for each element. These hit numbers specify the number of executions of each element that are necessary to achieve the required confidence in the correctness of that element. A code-coverage-based test data adequacy criterion incorporating estimates of the probability that a fault in a code element will cause a failure can be realized by requiring that each element be exercised by a number of test cases equal to or exceeding its hit number. In theory, such a criterion could be defined in terms of various types of code elements, including statements, basic blocks, decisions, or data dependencies, provided that (1) coverage of that element can be measured, (2) the notion of what it means for such an element to contain a fault can be defined, and (3) appropriate estimates of the probability that a fault in that element will cause a failure can be obtained. This work focuses on the use of individual program statements as elements, due to the relative simplicity of that approach and the availability of tools and estimates that operate at that level.
To provide a sense of the requirements of such a test adequacy criterion, Figure 1 depicts the relationship among fault exposure probability estimates, confidence levels, and hit numbers. The figure shows, for four fault exposure probability estimates (0.1, 0.2, 0.4, 0.8), the hit numbers required to achieve various confidence levels. The figure indicates that for a given fault exposure probability estimate, as confidence level increases, the hit number increases, and that the rate of increase accelerates. In other words, at high levels of confidence, obtaining an increase in confidence level requires a much larger boost in hit numbers than is required to obtain the same increase in confidence level at low levels of confidence. The figure also shows that when fault exposure probability is low, the hit number required to achieve high confidence is much larger than when fault exposure probability is high.
Intuitively, to achieve coverage for higher hit numbers, larger test suites are needed. Whether the relationship between confidence level and test suite size will be similar to the relationship between confidence level and hit number, however, must be investigated.
Estimating Fault Exposing Potential
The preceding section presented the issues in defining code-coverage-based test data adequacy criteria that incorporate estimates of the probability that a fault will cause a failure. This section considers the calculation of those estimates.
Voas [18] provides one method for performing such calculations, in the form of PIE (propagation, infection, and execution) analysis. PIE analysis assesses the probability that, under a given input distribution, if a fault exists in code element x, it will result in a failure. This probability, termed the sensitivity of x, is estimated by combining independent estimates of three probabilities: (1) the probability that x is executed (execution probability), (2) the probability that a change in x can cause a change in program state (infection probability), and (3) the probability that a change in state propagates to output (propagation probability).
PIE analysis uses various methods to obtain these estimates: (1) simple code instrumentation to estimate execution probability; (2) a variant of weak mutation [8] in which syntactic changes are applied to x and then the state after x is examined for effects to estimate infection probability; and (3) state perturbation, in which the data state following x is altered and then program output is examined for differences to estimate propagation probability.
Voas suggests that sensitivity estimates could be used in Equation 1 to calculate the number of executions of an element that are required to obtain a certain confidence in that element's correctness. For the purpose of calculating hit numbers, however, this approach has two disadvantages.
First, by factoring in execution probabilities, sensitivity measures the probability that a fault will cause a failure relative to an input distribution. In code-coverage-based testing, however, the effect of interest is the probability that, if a test case executes a code element x containing a fault, that fault will propagate to output. It is possible for x to have very high [low] infection and propagation probabilities with respect to the inputs that execute it, even though it has a very low [high] execution probability relative to an input distribution. The incorporation of execution probabilities into sensitivity estimates thus distorts the measure of the likelihood that a given test case that reaches x will expose a fault in x. For code-coverage-based testing, a more appropriate measure would consider only infection and propagation.
A second drawback of sensitivity in this context involves its treatment of propagation and infection estimates. Sensitivity analysis separately calculates these estimates, and uses a conservative approach to combine them. This approach can overpredict the probability that an arbitrary input will expose a fault and result in high estimates of that probability. Such high estimates, utilized to determine hit numbers by the process discussed in the preceding section, could yield excessively low hit numbers.
Thus, in this work, a different estimate of the probability that a fault in code element x will cause a failure is adopted. As in sensitivity analysis, mutation analysis [3, 6] is used to create m mutations of x. The program is then executed on a universe of test inputs, and for each test case t i that executes x, the number n i of mutants exposed by that test case is determined. Suppose that there are k test cases that execute x, and together, the sum of the n i (1 ≤ i ≤ k) for the k test cases equals n s . In this case the mutation analysis process has caused x to be executed k × m times. This value (k × m) is used to divide n s , obtaining an average value that indicates, for each test case t i that executes x, the probability that t i will reveal a mutant of x. The resulting value is referred to here as the fault exposing potential (FEP) estimate for x, described more formally by the following equation:
A test suite created by the process outlined in the preceding section to satisfy hit numbers calculated using FEP estimates is called a fault-exposing-potential-coverage-adequate (FEPC-adequate) test suite.
An issue in implementing the foregoing process involves the handling of equivalent mutants: mutants that cannot be exposed by any input to the program. In principle, such mutants should be eliminated from consideration, because they do not represent exposable faults; however, in practice, this is a difficult task.
Thus, another approach is to make no attempt to distinguish the equivalent mutants; instead, all mutants could be treated as faults that could potentially be exposed. FEP estimates gathered by this approach are underestimates of the FEP estimates that would be calculated given knowledge of mutant equivalence. The experimentation reported here involved over 150,000 mutants, and equivalent mutant identification was not feasible; thus, this second approach was taken.
Choosing the foregoing process for estimating fault-exposing-potential does not yield a particularly efficient process, because mutation analysis is expensive. The goal in this work, however, is not to examine the efficiency of a particular estimation technique, but rather, to investigate the predicate: given an estimate of fault-exposing-potential, could that estimate be used to advantage in creating test suites. A positive answer to this question would motivate a search for cost-effective methods for estimating fault-exposing-potential (several such methods are mentioned in Section 5); moreover, it is prudent to answer this question before embarking on a (potentially expensive) search for such estimation techniques.
Experiment 1
The research questions to be investigated can be informally stated as follows: 
Measures
To address these research questions, measures of the fault-detection effectiveness of a test suite and of test suite size are needed. Test suite size is measured in terms of the number of test cases in the test suite.
Measuring fault-detection effectiveness is not quite as simple. Given a program and a fault set for that program, the fault-detection effectiveness of a test suite for that program is defined as the percentage of faults in the fault set that can be detected by that test suite. This measure of a test suite's effectiveness is referred to here as the test suite's efficacy. More formally, given program P and fault set F for P , where F contains |F | faults, and given test suite T , if the execution of T on P reveals |F r | of the faults in F , the efficacy of T for P and F is given by |Fr| |F | * 100%.
Experiment Instrumentation
Programs
Eight C programs were used as subjects (see Table 1 ). The first seven programs were collected initially by researchers at Siemens corporation for use in experiments with dataflow and control-flow based test adequacy criteria [9] ; these are referred to here as the Siemens programs. The Siemens programs perform a variety of tasks: print tokens and print tokens2 are lexical analyzers, replace performs pattern matching and substitution, schedule and schedule2 are priority schedulers, tcas is an altitude separation warning simulation, and tot info computes statistics given input data. The eighth program, space, is an interpreter for an array definition language (ADL) used within a large aerospace application.
Test pool and test history
For each of the seven Siemens programs, the Siemens researchers created a test pool of black-box test cases using the category partition method and the Siemens Test Specification Language tool [13] . They then augmented this set with manually created white-box test cases to ensure that each exercisable statement, edge, and definition-use pair in the base program or its control flow graph was exercised by at least 30 test cases. This process produced test pools of the sizes shown in Table 1 .
Space has a test pool of 13,585 test cases. The first 10,000 test cases were randomly generated by Vokolos and Frankl [19] ; the remaining test cases were added by the authors of this study so that most executable branches in the program 3 were exercised by at least 30 test cases.
For this experiment, each program P was considered with its test pool U . For each test case in U and each statement in P , it was determined whether or not that statement was exercised by that test case. This information was used to create individual test suites for the programs, as described below.
Mutant pool and FEP matrix
The Proteum mutation system [2] was used to obtain mutant versions of the subject programs; this process produced between several and several dozen mutations of each executable statement in each subject program.
The set of mutants for each program was treated as the mutant pool for that program; Table 1 lists the size of these mutant pools. For each program, its mutant pool and test pool were used to evaluate the fault exposure potential of each statement in the program, as described in Section 2. This process generated
an FEP matrix for each program, which records the FEP estimates for each executable statement in that program.
Confidence levels
To address the research questions, FEPC-adequate test suites at several confidence levels were required.
Since confidence level is a continuous variable, for this experiment it was necessary to sample confidence level. Given the relationship depicted in Figure 1 in Section 2, it seemed sufficient to sample infrequently for low confidence levels, but more frequently for higher confidence levels; this led to the selection of confidence levels 0.1, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 0.9, 0.95, and 0.995. have different sizes, it is difficult to determine whether differences in the efficacy of those test suites are due to the coverage they obtain, or simply to their differing sizes. To assess whether differences in efficacy are due to the use of FEPC adequacy, it is necessary to control for size. it is possible to be much more certain that differences in efficacy, if found, are attributable to the use of fault exposure probability estimates. Thus, in these experiments, ASC test suites were employed.
Test suites
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Only the third approach provides the necessary controls to investigate the effects of FEPC-adequacy; thus, this approach was chosen.
This article refers to an FEPC-adequate test suite T k and its corresponding ASC suite (the suite created from the same statement-adequate base as T k ) as a test suite pair. For each program and each confidence level, 1000 (FEPC-adequate, ASC) test suite pairs were generated. Given the eight programs and seven confidence levels, this entailed the generation of 8 × 7 × 1000 = 56, 000 test suite pairs.
Fault sets
To measure test suite efficacy, fault sets were needed. In the first experiment the Original Fault Sets provided with the Siemens programs and space were used.
The Siemens researchers seeded the Siemens programs with faults; these faults were intended to be as "realistic" as possible, based on the researchers' experience with real programs. In contrast, space has 38 faults, including 33 faults discovered during its development and 5 discovered subsequently by the authors of this paper. The number of faults in the original fault set for each program is given in Table 1 in the rightmost column.
Experiment Design
Variables
The experiment manipulated two independent variables:
• The subject program (8 programs).
• The confidence level (7 different confidence levels).
Two dependent variables were measured:
• Fault-detection effectiveness (efficacy measure).
• Test suite size.
Design
The experiment used an 8 × 7 factorial design with 1000 paired efficacy measures per cell; the two categorical factors were program and confidence level. For each program P and confidence level c, the 1000 test suite pairs were run on the fault set. This yielded 112,000 paired efficacy measures; these formed the data set for subsequent analysis.
Threats to Validity
A discussion of the potential threats to the validity of this study follows.
Threats to external validity limit researchers' ability to generalize results. There are three primary threats to external validity for this study. First, the subject programs are of small and medium size.
Complex industrial programs with different characteristics may be subject to different cost-benefit tradeoffs.
However, the programs are nonetheless "real" programs, and space, in particular, is non-trivial. Moreover, the programs have been used in previous studies and are well understood, an advantage for controlled experimentation in a previously unstudied area. Second, only one variety of fault sets was used in this first experiment; these fault sets have drawbacks in terms of representativeness. Only the faults for space actually occurred in practice, and the Siemens faults represent only a small set of the types of possible faults.
Also, each fault was considered to be the only fault in the program while test cases were running against it.
In practice, programs have more complex error patterns, including faults that interact. However, the faults considered do constitute a subset of the types of faults found in practice, and the ability to create test suites effective at finding such faults would be worthwhile. The second experiment, moreover, considers additional fault types. Finally, this study considers only FEP estimates calculated relative to program statements; it would be possible to define FEP estimates based on other criteria, and these may behave differently.
Threats to internal validity are factors that can affect the dependent variables and are out of strict control in the experiment. For this study, there are two major concerns. First, differences among program subjects and in the composition of the test pools may affect results beyond researchers' understanding and ability to control. For example, the test pools are not operational distributions. Second, the method used to calculate FEP estimates provides one approach for approximating and using fault exposure probabilities; however, the approach does assume that mutants are appropriate representatives for the actual faults whose fault exposure probability they are being used to predict, and the approach does assume that all mutants have equal probability of representing a defect. There may be more accurate approaches.
Threats to construct validity arise when measurement instruments do not adequately capture the concepts they are supposed to measure. There are several such threats to consider for this experiment. First, efficacy
is not the only possible measure of test suite effectiveness. For example, the measures used assign no value to subsequent test cases that detect a fault already detected; such inputs may, however, help software engineers isolate the fault, and for that reason might be worth measuring. Second, the method used to measure faultdetection effectiveness calculates effectiveness relative to a fixed set of faults. This approach also assumes that faults have equal importance, an assumption that typically does not hold in practice. Third, this approach does not differentiate between test suites that detect faults multiple times (i.e., more than one test case in the test suite detects the fault) and test suites that detect a fault a single time.
Analysis and Results
Efficacy Results
Figure 2 depicts average efficacy values of the paired FEPC-adequate and ASC test suites measured against
the Original Fault Sets over the seven confidence levels. Each graph depicts results for one subject program.
In the graphs, each plotted point represents the mean of the 1000 efficacy values collected at a given confidence level for the FEPC adequate test suites (filled diamond plot symbol) and ASC adequate test suites (hollow circle plot symbol). The graphs depict the differences in fault-detection effectiveness between FEPC-adequate and ASC test suites.
As the graphs show, the average efficacy of FEPC-adequate suites and ASC suites increases as confidence level increases. This increase occurs for all programs, albeit at different rates. For print tokens2, The hypothesis being investigated is that the fault-detection effectiveness of FEPC-adequate suites will be better than the fault-detection effectiveness of ASC suites. Consequently, positive mean differences (that is, the difference between the average efficacies of the FEPC-adequate suites and ASC suites) are expected to be found in the data. To formally assess which mean differences are statistically significant, paired t-tests were run. Mean differences where the t-test value, ρ (rho), is less than or equal to a level of significance alpha of 0.05 are deemed statistically significant. 
Test Suite Sizes
As expected, the experiment showed that an increase in confidence level resulted in an increase in the size of corresponding FEPC-adequate test suites. Moreover, the rate of increase becomes larger as confidence level increases. 
Discussion
The foregoing results show that the incorporation of fault exposure probability estimates (in the form of Confidence level also affects results. Under confidence levels 0.1 and 0.4, the efficacies of ASC and FEPCadequate suites often do not significantly differ, or differ only slightly. However, at these confidence levels, most hit number requirements are small, and minimized statement coverage test suites may themselves be nearly FEPC-adequate. As confidence levels increase, the hit number requirements for many statements increase dramatically, reducing the likelihood that random augmentation of test suites will possess the "extra intelligence" inherent in adding test cases that focus on statements where faults are more likely to hide.
Of greatest importance in assessing these results, however, is that even though incorporation of a faultexposure-potential estimate did produce statistically significant increases in the efficacy of test suites, the increases were quite small. Statistical differences do not presage practical differences, and it is difficult to imagine that an overall average mean efficacy difference of less than 2% would offset the costs of calculating fault-exposing potential, even given a more efficient estimation technique, on any but the most safety-critical of systems. In this respect, the results ran contrary to the conjectures of previous researchers [5, 7, 18] .
Experiment 2
Because the results of the first experiment did not meet expectations, a second experiment was conducted.
In this experiment, a scenario was deliberately provided in which FEPC-adequate test suites should be more successful than in the previous experiment. The goal was to determine whether, under a set of faults potentially more amenable to detection by FEPC-adequate suites, those suites could achieve larger differences in efficacy than their corresponding ASC suites.
Measures, Instrumentation, and Design
In this experiment, the same measures, instrumentation (programs, test pools, mutant pools, confidence levels, and test suites), and design were used as in the first experiment, with the exception of fault sets.
Consequently, the threats to validity for this experiment, except for some of those involving fault sets dealt with separately below, remain the same as for the first experiment.
Fault sets
Two new types of fault sets were constructed.
Mutation fault sets.
Since the FEPC-adequate test suites were constructed using estimates based on simple mutations, it seemed possible that these tests suites might fare best applied to the same classes of faults used as mutations. Thus, a group of fault sets constructed from the mutations created by Proteum was utilized. These sets were obtained by randomly selecting, for each program, 200 mutants from the mutant pool for that program. The selection was restricted to mutants that were known to be non-equivalent: that is, mutants for which there existed at least one test case, in the test pool, that exposed that mutant.
Tough fault sets. It seemed that if FEPC-adequate test suites could function well on simple mutation-like faults, they might attain even greater efficacy when applied to faults that are difficult to detect. Thus, a group of tough fault sets, consisting of relatively difficult to detect mutations, was also utilized. This set was obtained by randomly selecting mutants from the mutant pool that had FEP estimates less than 0.2, but greater than 0.0 (and were thus not equivalent mutants). 6 Tough fault sets of size 200 were selected for each program except schedule, for which there were only 90 qualified mutants.
Since the FEP estimates used in this process were derived from mutations, using mutants as faults can indeed be seen as potentially "setting the technique up for success". Thus, positive results obtained on these fault sets might be viewed with suspicion, in particular with respect to issues of external validity.
The goal in this experiment, however, was to investigate whether the lack of effect observed in the first experiment might generalize. By using mutants as faults in this subsequent investigation, this experiment uses exactly those faults that one might expect FEPC-adequate test suites to perform well against, and thus, if differences in efficacy values are not achieved against these faults, this supports a much stronger argument that FEPC-adequacy does not improve efficacy. The mean differences obtained against the Mutation Fault Sets are shown in Table 3 (using the same type style conventions used in larger than those of the ASC suites, the size difference became less, and where the mean efficacy values of ASC suites were larger than those of FEPC-adequate suites (schedule and replace) the disparity lessened.
Analysis and Results
Mutation Fault Sets
At the overall confidence level (bottom row), all entries continued to indicate increased effectiveness.
Again, however, for all but one entry (cl = 0.1), the mean differences observed are lower than those observed with the Original Fault Set, suggesting less gain in fault-detection as a result of employing FEPC-adequacy with these fault sets.
The individual table entries, for the most part, reflect the same movement toward 0.0 difference typically exhibited at the overall program and overall confidence levels. Fault Sets. The graphs again exhibit efficacy trends across confidence levels similar to those observed for the the other fault sets. Here, the mean differences in efficacy values are indeed, and as expected, higher than those displayed in Figure 4 , presumably reflecting the differences in fault difficulty between these fault sets.
Tough Fault Sets
The mean differences obtained against the Tough Fault Sets are shown in Table 4 show that at the overall confidence level, for all levels except 0.1, the mean differences in efficacies measured against the Tough Fault Sets were better than those measured against the Mutation Fault Sets.
Note, however, that few of the mean efficacy differences shown in Table 4 are greater than those found with the Original Fault Sets (Table 2) ; in fact, more often, the mean efficacy differences calculated here are smaller than those calculated in the first experiment.
Discussion
The results for the two new fault sets again show that incorporation of fault exposure probability estimates (in probabilistically, hard-to-detect faults are expected to be located in statements that have low FEP estimates and, consequently, high hit numbers; FEPC-adequate suites should be more effective than ASC suites at exercising these statements. These observations suggest, then, that the estimate of fault exposing potential employed has been at least somewhat successful at capturing the underlying probabilities.
Again, however, in this second experiment as in the first, the efficacy benefits gained from FEPC-adequate test suites varied widely among the different programs, and again, the efficacy gains observed were not large.
Moreover, the efficacy gains were even smaller than those observed in the first experiment, despite the deliberate use of faults that might be considered the faults on which FEPC-adequacy would be most likely to provide benefits.
Overall Discussion
As discussed earlier, these experiments, like any other, have several limits to their validity. Keeping this in mind, several observations can be drawn from the experiments' results.
First, as already stated, in both of the experiments, FEPC-adequate test suites were observed to be statistically significantly better than ASC test suites at detecting faults. However, the magnitude of the efficacy difference observed was quite small, leading naturally to the question whether the use of FEPadequacy could be practically cost-effective, even given an efficient estimation technique. In this context, it is interesting to consider a further observation about FEPC-adequate test suites.
Consider the graph of efficacy results for schedule2 in Figure 5 . In this case, at confidence level 0.6, the mean efficacy of the ASC suites was 52.5% and the mean efficacy of the FEPC-adequate suites was 61%.
However, it is clear from the graph that ASC suites for (approximately) confidence level 0.8 achieved the same efficacy as FEPC-adequate suites at level 0.6. This example illustrates a more general observation: for any FEPC-adequate test suite T , there exists some ASC suite (some statement adequate test suite to which n test cases have been randomly added), that achieves the same average efficacy as T .
Since the cost of obtaining FEPC-adequate test suites may be high, the fact that test suites of equivalent efficacy can be generated by random addition of a sufficient number of test cases to an already-coverageadequate suite is interesting. In this case, the relative cost-benefits of the two types of test suites depend on both (1) the cost of the analysis necessary to obtain the FEPC-adequate test suites, and (2) This observation should be further qualified. The examinations of test suite size reported on here show that as confidence level increases, the size of FEPC-adequate test suites increases dramatically. At higher confidence levels, the number of test cases that must be randomly added to an ASC suite to achieve the efficacy of some FEPC-adequate suite is much higher than at lower confidence levels. Therefore, when higher confidence is required, there is greater potential for FEPC-adequate suites to be more cost-effective (depending on the relative costs of test execution and FEP estimation analysis) than ASC suites.
A natural open question is whether, and the degree to which, these results might generalize to larger software systems. Since no other studies of this type have been performed on such subjects, it is difficult to predict how these results would scale up. However, the results were consistent across subjects that had differences of one order of magnitude in size, ranging from 138 LOCs to 6218 LOCs, supporting a conjecture that results will scale. Further, it is certain that the computation of fault exposure probabilities via the approach investigated is very expensive, and might be prohibitively costly for larger subjects.
Finally, however, it is important to note that other estimates of fault-exposing potential do or could exist. Goradia [4] presents one such approach, in which impact graphs are analyzed to estimate propagation probabilities. Alternatively, one could adopt Voas' sensitivity estimate, despite the drawbacks suggested of it. Another approach might make use of constrained mutation [12] , which utilizes a subset of the full set of mutation operators. Some of these approaches could be more efficient at providing estimates than the one used in these experiments, lowering the threshold at which cost-effectiveness could be achieved. Conceivably, some of these approaches could also compute more effective estimates than the one used in these studies.
Conclusions
Although several researchers have hypothesized that the incorporation of fault exposure probability estimates into test data adequacy criteria could improve the fault-detection effectiveness of test suites, this suggestion has not previously been empirically investigated. This paper has presented the first formal experiments directed at this hypothesis.
Contrary to previous suggestions, the results of these experiments indicate that, although incorporation of fault exposure potential estimates into test adequacy criteria may produce statistically significant improvements in fault detection, the magnitude of the improvement may not be great, and may not justify the cost of computing estimates and creating such test suites. Although largely a negative result in terms of leading to any practical testing technique, these results are still important: they are the first to provide real data suggesting that the intuitively attractive notion of incorporating fault exposure probability estimates may not be cost-effective.
